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Abstract
Prior  to disclosure regulat ions being put in place, firms have been 
observed to voluntar ily  provide funds s t a t e m e n ts  along with their  o ther  
financial s ta temen ts .  The purpose of this paper  is to inves t iga te  the 
incent ives of firms to do this, given the type of investment  and financing 
con tracts  the firm has in place. The theory of f ree cash flow proposed by
Jensen (1986a, 1986b) is used to develop hypotheses  re la t ing such voluntary 
report ing  to leverage, re ta ined  earnings, the ex ten t  of growth options 
possessed by the firm, changes in dividend policy, size, and divers i ty  in 
investment  contracts .  Empirical t e s t s '  indicate weak support  for these 
hypotheses .
11. INTRODUCTION
In both the Uni ted  Sta te s  and Aust ral ia  the p repara t ion  and
disclosure of cash flow or "funds" s t a t e m e n ts  is now extensively regulated
through severa l  jurisdictions. In the U.S. the funds s t a t e m e n t  has been the 
subject  of regula t ion since 1963, when the APB issued Opinion no. 3 to 
recommend that  funds s t a t e m e n ts  be p resen ted  as supplementary  information 
in f inancial reports .  This ini t ia t ive was endorsed short ly a f t e rw ards  by 
both the New York Stock Exchange and the Financial  Analysts  Federat ion.  
More recen t ly  the FASB, supported by both the SEC and the Financial 
Execut ives  Ins t i tu te ,  has required a s t a t e m e n t  that  is based on a more
l i t e ra l  def ini t ion of cash. In Austral ia ,  the stock exchanges have required 
l is ted companies  to provide a funds s t a t e m e n t  since 1973, the format  of 
which has been the subject of a professional  s tandard  (AAS 12) since 1983. 
Fol lowing the U.S. process, Aust ral ian  regula tors  are  curren t ly  consider ing 
replacing or supplementing the conventional  funds s t a t e m e n t  with a
s t a t e m e n t  closer  to receipts  and payments  (ASRB, 1986). In this paper ,  the 
term "funds s ta tement"  is used gencrical ly.  At this s tage  of the research 
we are  not  t rying to dist inguish reasons for using d i f f e ren t  methods of
compiling such s ta tements .
Pr ior  to regulat ions being put in place, firms in both the U.S. and 
Aus t ra l ia  have been observed to voluntar ily  disclose funds s ta temen ts .  For 
example,  in the U.S., prior to the 1960’s regula tory  activity,  Gladson (1958) 
found tha t  35% of the 100 largest  corporat ions disclosed funds s ta tements .  
Although a number of casual  explanat ions have been o f fe red  for why firms 
might voluntar i ly  provide funds s ta t em en ts  there  is a paucity of explanat ion 
as to the reason why management  would regard such an activity  to be
2value increasing for the firm.* Importantly,  explanations to date  have not 
been able to discriminate between which firms would be more likely (or less 
likely) to disclose." It is the purpose of this paper to invest igate the 
incentives of firms to voluntarily supply funds sta tements given the type of 
investment and financing contracts the firm has in place. This paper 
invest igates this issue from within the framework of analysis provided by 
the theory of ‘free cash flow’ [Jensen (1986a,b)]. The paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 describes the theory of free cash flow and application 
of the theory to voluntary disclosure of funds statements.  Section 3
develops a number of hypotheses about the at tr ibutes  of firms likely to 
engage in such disclosures. Section 4 describes the data  collection and 
empirical results while Section 5 presents  a summary and principal 
conclusions.
1 In contrast it is difficult to argue that voluntary disclosure is a
costless activity for the firm. Apart from direct costs associated
with production of additional information the firm bears indirect costs 
such as risks associated with exposure to additional legal liability 
associated with use of the information by creditors, debtholders,
shareholders, etc.
2 For example Carson (1949) argued that voluntary funds statement 
disclosure reflected fiduciary duties of management:
...management is in a fiduciary capacity ethically and 
actually. They stand in this relationship with the 
stockholders primarily, and to a lesser extent with
creditors, employees, government agencies, potential  
investors, and the public at large.
If this is the position that management occupies, it is 
clear that financial accounting must provide, above all 
else, records that show the source of all funds provided 
and or secured by the management, and the disposition 
they have made of them.
However, in the absence of uniformly high levels of voluntary funds 
statement disclosure across firms, such an explanation is deficient in
that it does not show how fiduciary duties vary between firms.
32. FREE CASH FLOW THEORY
Following Jensen (1986, p. 323) f ree  cash flow emerges in the firm
when, during the life of the firm, there  exists  a cash flow in excess of
that  requ ired  to fund all avai lable  posit ive net present  value projects  at
the re levan t  cost of capital .  Free  cash flow emerges from conversion of 
income to cash and from other  firm act ivi t ies  closely r e la te d  to receipt  of 
cash (e.g. sale of plant,  equity f loats and debt  issues). Consequently f ree
cash flow is available  not  only to growing firms but also to firms in
decline. Moreover,  the existence of economic rent s  or quazi r e n t s 3 is
typically associated with the existence of f ree  cash flow. Because cash is 
a highly plast ic  resource [Alchian and Woodward (1986)1,4 f ree  cash flow
resu l ts  in poten t ia l ly  high agency costs b e tw een  owners  and managers. 
When it is in managers ’ in te res t s  to keep the firm growing (or at least
main tain its p resent  size) but no posit ive net  presen t  value projects  are
avai lable,  managers  use free cash flow to invest in nega t ive  net  present
value projects . In such cases, a l though it is in the best in te res t s  of
shareho lders  for the free  cash flow to be d i s t r ibu ted  by dividend or share
repurchase,  management  acts contra ry to the shareho lder s ’ in te res t s  by
reta in ing cash. Where the va lue -dec reas ing  e ffec ts  of this r e ten t ion  are 
recognized by the market  the value of the firm is reduced. Evidence cited
3 Economic Rent s  imply prices above marginal cost in the long run
while quazi rent s  are rents  in excess of the short  run opportuni ty
cost of capital .  A future  q u a z i - r e n t  s t ream does not imply economic
ren ts  unless the net  present  value of the investment  exceeds zero
[Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978, p.299)]. However  both phenomena 
do imply, at  least  in the short run, an excess of cash in the firm.
4 Alchian and Woodward’s descr ipt ion of cash as a highly "plastic"
resource deno tes  both a wide range of "legi timate" decisions with
which cash can be used and also the poor re l iabi li ty with which it
can be monitored.  Alchian and Woodward argue (p.14):
"The implication is that  managers ,  as agents  of owners,
handling large cash balances or cash flows will be
subjected to g r e a t e r  controls and review by principals".
4Evidence cited by Jensen (1986b) indicates that this agency cost of equity is 
substantial  (pp. 20-26)5 and plausibly is the cause of much takeover activity 
(pp. 27-43). A useful example he provides is that of the U.S. oil industry
in the early 1970’s where, partially because of the activities of the OPEC 
cartel,  the price of oil sharply increased yet the industry needed to
contract due to declining U.S. oil consumption.
The problem is mitigated by, among other  factors, the presence of
debt or the availability of profitable projects. As debt implies an
enforceable promise by management to pay out cash flows in the form of 
principal and interest,  their production/investment decisions are more 
regularly monitored in a manner that occurs when firms obtain new capital.
This monitoring is avoided when projects are financed by retained earnings 
and could explain the well documented share price reductions that occur 
when leverage reducing security issues take place.6 Moreover, where the
firm has options to invest in a substantial number of positive net present 
value projects, then there is no incentive for managers to expand their 
firms beyond the (optimum) size that maximizes shareholder wealth.
5 Jensen reports (p. 20) that "The predictions of the agency cost of
free cash flow are consistent with all but two of the 32 estimated
abnormal stock price changes summarized in Table 2". Jensen reviews 
evidence with respect to announcements of increases and decreases in 
dividends, sales and ret irement of debt (with and without bond
covenants) and repurchase of shares.
6 Jensen reports sale of industrial securities that raise cash and do not
bond future cash flow payments earn on average two-day  
announcement return of -3.1%. For utilities the return is -0.7%. 
The reported result is derived from Smith (1986, Table 1) and in the 
case of industrials is calculated from returns in Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Kolodny and Suhle (1985), Masulis and Korwar (1986),
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Schipper and Smith (1986). For
uti lit ies results are derived from Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis 
and Korwar (1985) and Pettway and Ratcliffe (1986).
53. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES OF FUNDS STATEMENTS
In the face of high agency costs of equity  when f ree  cash flows are
expected,  management  can invoke a number of mechanisms by which it can
bond i tself  to equi ty  holders. For  example,  as indicated above, management 
could indicate  its in ten t ion to raise dividends or repurchase stock when
posit ive net  present  value projects  are  not available.  The problem with the
opera t io n  of a mechanism of this type is that  it is difficult  for
management  to effec t ively bond i tse lf  through no n -  enforceable  promises
given incentives  to pursue sub-op t im al  firm growth.  Moreover , any at tempt
by management  to raise  the dividend a f t e r  f ree  cash flow is revea led to
shareho lders  will be of l i t t le  use as the market will have already
ant ic ipa ted  opportunism by the managers and reduced the value of the
equi ty accordingly. As an a l te rna t ive ,  management can agree (or
d em ons t ra te )  that growth will only be associated with the exercise of
opt ions on posit ive net presen t value projects.  The diff icul ty encountered
here is tha t  the value of growth opt ions to the firm is dependent ,  at  least 
in par t ,  on the abil ity of the firm to exercise that  opt ion to the exclusion 
of o ther  firms. Reve la t ion  of the growth  opt ion through disclosure to 
equity  holders, whilst reducing the agency costs of equity,  also reduces the 
value of the opt ion to the firm.
What emerges then is that  managers  who ant ic ipa te  posit ive cash 
flow, in the presence of prof i tab le  investment  opportuni t ies ,  will seek an 
eff ic ien t  mechanism ex ante  to reduce the agency costs of equi ty associated 
with the m a r k e t ’s expecta t ions of management  behaviour  in the presence of 
f ree  cash flow. In consequence, we argue that  f ree  cash flow theory 
implies incent ives to voluntar ily provide information about  cash flows 
through the provision of funds s t a t em en ts  (or, for that  mat te r ,  other
6disclosures) in order  to reduce the agency cost of equi ty in these si tuations.  
Given that  costs are  associated with monitoring mechanisms, d i rec ted  at 
curta i l ing adverse management  behavior  (for example,  compensat ion contracts),  
funds s ta t e m e n ts  reduce the costs of equi ty holders dete rmining if the 
major  cont ract ing  provision implied by (say) compensation contracts  (viz. 
maximizing the value of equity in the firm) have been violated by the 
presence of any free cash flow.
An issue which arises at this point re la tes  to the incremental  value
of a funds s t a t em en t  to the equi ty holders given that  they are a lready 
receiving an income s ta tement .  Income s ta tements ,  as measurement
instruments  for varia t ions in firm weal th,  only provide an indirect  measure
of cash flow because of accruals. Di fferences be tw een  accrued income and
cash flows mean that ,  at any time, income numbers do not measure
disposable resources  available to managers . Managers,  by voluntar ily  bonding 
themselves to the publ ication of funds s ta t em en ts  provide incremental
information but bear  addit ional  costs which they may avoid in the absence
of the po ten t ia l ly  high agency costs of equity in these s ituations.
Moreover , for reasons descr ibed by Leftwich,  Watts and Zimmerman (1981, p. 
57) the marginal  costs of voluntary disclosures for management  in these
circumstances may be low compared with costs of cash flow est imat ion by 
equity holders.
These s ta t em en ts  (voluntari ly provided audited report s)  enable 
outside common and preference  shareholders  and fixed claim 
holders to de termine  if contract  provisions have been violated.  
Moreover,  it is in the in te res ts  of the manager  to provide 
these report s  voluntarily: Suppose, for example, that  the
bondholders (...) would find it worthwhile  to produce de ta i led
financial s ta tements . . . I f  the manager  himself can produce such 
information at lower costs than they (perhaps because he‘s 
a l ready collect ing much of the da ta  for his own internal  
decision makin purposes), it would pay him to agree in advance 
to incur the cost of providing such reports.
7Smith and Warner (1979 p. 143) pursue the same argument with respect to
voluntary disclosures to bondholders.
Our analysis suggests that bondholders find financial s tatements 
to be useful in ascertaining whether provisions of the contract 
have been/or are about to be violated. If the firm can 
produce this information at a lower cost than the bondholders,
... it pays the firm’s stockholders to contract to provide this 
information...to the bondholders.
Consequently, we argue that the less likely the presence of free cash flows, 
the grea te r  the incentive to reduce users’ processing costs by providing 
information that directly describes the funds under the control of
management and the way they are used, in order to reduce the expected 
penalty on the firm’s share price imposed by the market.
Our problem with respect to empirically test ing this proposition is 
that it is not immediately clear how to observe the likelihood of free cash 
flows. However,  the analysis provided by Jensen (1986a,b) does suggest 
some proxies.
First,  the probability of free cash flows is reduced where the firm 
has the option to undertake profitable projects. Where these options are 
of an intangible nature the incentives of management to disclose financial
information is particularly strong because such options are unable to support 
debt.
HI: The grea ter  the growth options possessed by the firm, the more
likely the voluntary disclosure of funds statements.
Jensen’s analysis also suggests other proxies that are more equivocal. 
In particular he shows that the problem is by mitigated the presence of
debt. Hence, everything else equal, we would expect free cash flow to be 
negatively associated with debt. However, given the analysis by Myers 
(1977) we would expect high growth firms (= low free cash flow) to have
8low debt.  A similar problem arises with respect  to earnings re ten t ions  and 
dividends. If the Myers and Majluf (1984) "pecking order" theory of
financing decisions is t rue,  then firms with subs tant ia l  growth opt ions will 
p re f e r  to finance by re ta ined  earnings r a the r  than o the r  methods of 
financing. No twiths tanding these sources of noise, we expect  that  where 
growth and o ther  factors  are held constant ,  the likelihood of f ree  cash flow 
is increasing with lower leverage,  higher re ta ined  earnings,  as well as low 
and decreasing dividends. This is schematized in Figure 1. Hence we
hypothesize that :
H2: Firms are  more likely to voluntari ly provide funds s ta tements :
H2A: the higher their  deb t / a sse t s  ratio.
H2B: the lower their  re ta ined earnings/assets  ratio.
H2C: where they reduce the dividend payment  as a percen tage  of 
net profi t.
9Figure 1
Incentives to Disclose and Proxies
IS FREE CASH FLOW LIKELY?
Do Not Disclose Disclose Funds
Funds Statements Statements
Proxies
Low Growth Opportunit ies 
Low Leverage 
High Retained Earnings 
Low & Decreasing Dividends
Proxies
High Growth Opportunit ies 
High Leverage 
Low Retained Earnings 
High & Stable Dividends
Hypotheses 1 and 2 assume that it is costly for equity holders to 
prepare their  own funds sta tements from the income statement,  balance 
sheet and other  data supplied by the firm. Consequently, it would be 
expected that the costs of "home made" sta tements increases with firm size 
and diversity of the investment contracts of the firm. Therefore,  we 
propose:
H3: that the voluntary provision of cash flow sta tements is more likely
for firms that are
H3A: larger
H3B: more diverse in their investment contracts.
It should be noted with respect to H3 that size and diversity by 
themselves represent  nei ther  necessary nor sufficient conditions for voluntary 
disclosure of cash flows. Instead it is the association of size and
10
diversi ty  of inves tments  in firms, t oge the r  with the factors  in Hypothesis  1 
and 2, which increases  the probabi li ty  of voluntary funds flow disclosure.
To what  ex ten t  are  there  a l t e rna t ive  explanat ions that  could be 
control led for in the research design? Two plausible rival explanat ions are 
that  firms are  more likely to voluntar ily provide funds s t a t e m e n ts  where 
costs are lower. If this is the "real" explanat ion, then although we would
expect  to observe Hypothesis 3 supported there  would be no need to expect  
support for HI  nor H2.
4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD
Provision of cash flow s ta t em en ts  by l is ted public companies
effect ively became manda tory in Aus tral ia  a f t e r  revision of l isting 
requi rements  of the Austral ian Associated Stock Exchanges on March 1,
1973. Pr ior  to inclusion of that  requ irement  in the stock exchange 
regulations,  disclosure of cash flow information was voluntary.  The
accounting profession in Aus tral ia  published Technical Bullet in F I  "The Funds 
Sta tement"  in 1971 which included a recommendat ion tha t  a funds s ta t em en t  
be p resen ted  to shareholders .  Subsequently,  the profession has mandated 
the disclosure of funds s ta t em en ts  through AAS12, following a number of 
recommendat ions that  funds s ta t em en ts  be disclosed with the accounts, a 
Discussion Paper  (No. 2) issued by the Austral ian Accounting Research 
Foundat ion (1979) and an Exposure Draf t  on the proposed format.
Although these regulations and formal recommendations all occurred 
subsequent  to 1970, considerat ion of the funds s ta t em en t  by policymakers 
was explicit  f rom 1966, when a report  issued by the General  Council of the 
Aust ra l ian Society of Accountants,  Accounting Principles and Pract ices
11
Discussed in Reports on Company Failures, proposed that "funds statements 
can usefully be included with published financial s tatements,  although these 
sta tements  should not be required by legislation". Further , Zeff  (1973, p.14) 
s tates  that in the same year the Stock Exchanges resolved to "actively
promote" the inclusion of a funds statement in the annual accounts of all 
listed companies.
Hence, we specified the pre- regulat ion period to be prior to 1970,
and collected a sample of 30 firms that voluntarily provided a funds
s ta tement in their annual reports before that year. In order to be sure
that any results were not confounded by anticipation of the stock exchange
regulations and professional recommendations, the sample was strat if ied so 
that 15 of the firms were voluntary providers prior to the initial
consideration of the matte r  by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges in 
1966.
This sample of firms, or "experimental group", was matched by a 
control group of firms. The matching criterion was date  of initial 
disclosure only, so that the characteristics of each funds statement provider 
were compared to the characteristics for the same years of a firm that did 
not provide a funds statement prior to the stock exchange mandatory
requirement announced in 1971. Apart from the matching on year of 
disclosure, the control group was randomly selected.
For each firm, the ratios of debt/assets,  retained earnings/assets and 
ordinary dividends/earnings were collected, as well as the total book value 
of assets. These variables were used to test, respectively, H1A, H1B, H2, 
and H3A. However, we also needed proxies for the extent of growth
options available to the firm and diversity in investment contracts. For
12
growth options we used the ratio of the market value to the book value 
of the firm. For diversity in investment contracts we used the number of 
separately incorporated subsidiaries.
Values fo r each of these variables were gathered for 5 separate
years for each firm. The year when the first disclosure was first made
was specified as year t, and values were collected for this year, as well as
years t -5 ,  t -1 ,  t + 1, and t+2. This enabled us to test the hypotheses both 
cross sectionally and over time.
5. RESULTS
Although some tests were marginally significant, the results did not 
completely support the hypotheses. Table 1 provides cell means, s tandard 
deviations, t tests and one tailed probabilities for each variable for the 5 
separate years. Mann-Whitney probabilities are also reported; however the
parametric tests are relied on in the presence of equal cell sizes (Glass, 
Peckham and Sanders, 1972). Table 2 presents  the results when the
analysis is specified as a 2(*5) analysis of variance with (non)disclosure of a 
funds statement as a grouping factor and years specified as a repeated 
measures factor. (This was also analyzed with "time" (prior to 1966, 
subsequent to 1966) specified as a second grouping factor, but the time 
factor was not significant and there was no material difference in results.) 
Table 3 provides the results of five multiple regressions, run for each of 
the five years, with (non)disclosure specified as a dichotomous dependent 
variable and the three ratios, as well as total assets and number of
subsidiaries specified as independent variables.
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None of these analyses  resu l ted  in significance levels that  we are 
willing to def in i te ly  accept,  given the large number of te s t s  undertaken  and 
the commensura te  inf la t ion in the experimentwise  e rro r  ra te .  Nevertheless ,  
there  is some support for the hypotheses  in the resul ts.
Hypothesis  1 proposes that  disclosure policy is r e l a ted  to the growth 
var iable .  There  is some support  for this in the resul ts , as Table 1 
indicates  tha t  the rat io  is marginal ly significant  for at  least  the three 
years  up to and including the year  of disclosure. The var iable  is also
signif icant in the mult iple regressions for the same years.  With respect to
Hypothesis  2 there  is no support  for the relat ionsh ip with leverage. Table
1 indicates  tha t  this is not significant  for any year  measured.  This is 
cons is tent  with the ANOVA table ( table  3) a l though the r epe a te d  measures  
factor  is s ignificant,  with follow up contras ts  indicating tha t  the firms in
both disclose and non-disclose groups tended to increase their  leverage 
during the sample period.
There  is also no support  in the results for re ta ined earn ings / to tal
assets ,  a l though table  1 indicates that cell means are  in the direct ion
hypothesized.  This is significant  in t - 1  at the .059 level. However ,  this is 
not  t aken  seriously in view of the number of con tras ts  undertaken  and 
considering tha t  ne i the r  the ANOVA in table 2 nor the multiple regressions 
in table 3 show any significant  resul ts  for this variable.
For dividends the resul ts  again were not s ignificant.  A correctly 
specified tes t  of the hypothesis  implies an in ter  action be tw een  the grouping 
and r e p e a te d  measures  factor.  Table 2 indicates that  this is only 
signif icant  at  .22 (this, of course, is a two tai led test).
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H3 predicts tha t  firms that  disclose are  likely to be larger  and more 
diverse  in their  inves tment  contracts .  Supporting this, table  1 shows that
disclosing firms were s ignificantly larger  with respect  to the book value of
total  asset s  for all years  except  t -5 .  Consis tent  with this, the  ANOVA
described in table  2 indicates a significant  inte rac t ion  be tw een
(non)disclosure and years. Not surprisingly, the r ep e a te d  measures  factor  is 
highly significant,  evidencing the unremarkable  fact that  the book value of 
the assets  of both groups of firms increased during the sample period. 
Table 1 also shows that  disclosing firms also had (marginally)  s ignificantly 
more subsidiaries throughout  the sample period. Similar to the resul ts  for 
tota l  assets ,  the repea te d  measures  factor  is significant.  However ,  the
inte rac t ion  is not significant,  ref lect ing that  a l though firms in the sample
tended  to gain more subsidiaries during the period, the r a te  of increase 
does not d i ff e r  be tw een  the two groups.
The resul ts  of the mult iple regressions poten t ia l ly  provide a more 
ref ined tes t  of our hypotheses , as they allow growth to be held constant  
while the o ther  effec ts  are  being tes ted.  Although this did not result  in 
increased significance of these o ther  factors,  it is notable  that  the
significance of the growth factor  remains when o ther  variables  are 
control led for; whereas  the other  variables  lose significance, par t icularly  
to tal  assets.
6. DISCUSSION
At this s tage  we are not able to claim that  the resul ts  unequivocally 
confirm the theory.  With respect  to leverage,  re ta ined  earn ings / to ta l  assets  
and dividends/earnings the resul ts  are not consistent  with the theory; 
a lthough there  is weak support  in the resul ts  for market  value/book value,
15
total  assets and number of subsidiaries. Even here, results are only 
marginally significant.
Although the results may be clarified by increasing the sample size, 
at this point it is worthwhile considering why the theory is not
unequivocally supported. Presumably other factors are operating. For 
example, it could be that the factors that we acknowledged to cause 
weakness in the proxies may cause more "noise" than we expected. Perhaps 
the most surprising result is the nonsignificance of the leverage variable, 
which we expected to increase as the frequency of disclosure increased. It 
appears that other factors were having an opposite effect .  One possibility 
could be that as leverage increases, the demands of creditors for a funds 
statement  makes it less costly for management to provide the same 
statements  to shareholders, an effect  that counterbalances the one we 
proposed. Hopefully, such other determinants can be clarified by further 
research.
Apart from clarifying the results of the present research it is also 
suggested that future work could involve determining why firms have 
voluntarily disclosed dif ferent  types of funds statements.
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Table 1: Cell Means, S tandard  D eviations and t T ests  on V ariab les Grouped 
by (Non) Disclosure of Funds S ta tem en ts  
(n = 30, N = 60)
DISCLOSE NOT DISCLOSE
Standard Standard O n e - ta i le d Mann
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation t p ro b a ­ Whitney
(df=58) bility o n e -
ta iled
probability
Market Value/Book Value of Equity
t - 5 1.253 .958 .976 .512 1.397 .084 .248
t - 1 1.620 1.845 1.062 .478 1.604 .057 .282
to 1.432 1.316 1.023 .532 1.578 .060 .282
t + 1 1.407 1.241 1.145 .760 .985 .164 .388
t+2 1.188 .660 1.174 .829 .075 .870 .347
Leverage
t - 5 .349 .204 .361 .187 .237 .407 .412
t - 1 .408 .159 .384 .209 .515 .304 .221
to .396 .137 .378 .200 .416 .339 .287
t+1 .442 .238 .392 .221 .830 .205 .204
t+2 .413 .143 .399 .236 .284 .389 .297
R eta ined  E arn ings/Tota l Assets
t - 5 .162 .166 .199 .141 .936 .176 .071
t - 1 .167 .117 .216 .124 1.582 .059 .054
tO .182 .125 .207 .126 .751 .278 .168
t+1 .182 .124 .206 .128 .713 .239 .204
t+2 .175 .118 .208 .125 1.064 .146 .152
Dividends/Earnings
t - 5 .469 .246 .544 .262 1.138 .130 .089
t - 1 .475 .272 .529 .214 .847 .200 .326
to .804 1.610 .503 .237 1.014 .157 .429
t + 1 .522 .214 .530 .232 .149 .441 .450
t+2 .494 .198 .663 .686 1.291 .101 .154
Log of To ta l  Assets  (000s)
t - 5 8.447 2.982 8.521 1.608 .120 .452 .183
t - 1 9.629 1.602 8.926 1.723 1.636 .053 .044
to 9.695 1.625 9.002 1.694 1.617 .055 .044
t+1 9.815 1.671 9.086 1.781 1.636 .053 .057
t+2 9.943 1.706 9.246 1.656 1.605 .057 .055
Log of Number o f Subsidiaries
t - 5 1.857 2.822 1.058 2.309 1.200 .117 .111
t - 1 2.038 1.908 1.317 2.136 1.379 .086 .060
to 2.054 1.939 1.384 2.158 1.266 .105 .090
t+1 2.157 1.916 1.391 2.190 1.442 .077 .063
t+2 2.259 1.909 1.550 2.068 1.379 .086 .047
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Table 2: Analysis of Variance 
Dependent Variable: Leverage
df MS F Significance
(Non) Disclosure 1 .027 .199 ns
Error 58 .135
Years 4 .033 2.308 .059
Error 232 .014
Years x (Non) Disclosure 4 .007 .500 ns
Error 232 .014
Dependent Variable: Retained Earnings/Total Assets
df MS F Significance
(Non) Disclosure 1 .084 1.193 .279
Error 58 .071
Years 4 .002 .553 ns
Error 232 .004
Years x (Non) Disclosure 4 .002 .483 ns
Error 232 .004
Dependent Variable: Market Value/Book Value of Equity
df MS F Significance
(Non) Disclosure 1 6.933 2.354 .130
Error 58 2.945
Years 4 .451 .865 ns
Error 232 .522
Years x (Non) Disclosure) 4 .607 1.162 .328
Error 232 .522
Dependent Variable: Dividends/Earnings
df MS F Significance
(Non) Disclosure 1 .000 0 ns
Error 58 .427
Years 4 .244 .735 ns
Error 232 .332
Years x (Non) Disclosure 4 .479 1.444 .220
Error 232 .332
20
Dependent Variable: Assets
df MS F Significai
(Non) Disclosure 1 22.661 1.519 .223
Error 58 14.920
Years 4 11.324 21.092 .000
Error 232 .537
Years x (Non) Disclosure 4 1.826 3.401 .010
Error 232 .537
Dependent Variable: Number of Subsidiaries
df MS F Significa;
(Non) Disclosure 1 40.315 1.925 .171
Error 58 20.947
Years 4 1.603 2.909 .022
Error 232 .551
Years x (Non) Disclosure 4 .038 .068 ns
Error 232 .551
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T a b l e  21: M u l t ip le R e g r e s s io n C o e f f i c i e n t s ,  l V a lu e s  an d  O n e - t a i l e d P r o b a b i l i t i e s
R e g r e s s i o n
R e t a i n e d
E a r n in g s M a r k e t  V a lu e D iv id e n d s Log
L og  N u m b er  
of
M o d e l L e v e r a g e A s s e t s B ook V a lu e E a r n in g s A s s e t s S u b s id ia r ie s
t - 5
C o e f f i c i e n t .305 .398 - .1 4 5 .276 .009 - .0 3 4
t .790 .818 -1 .6 5 5 1.037 .317 -1 .2 5 3
p ro b .216 .208 .052 .152 .376 .108
t - 1
C o e f f i c i e n t .039 .651 - .0 7 6 .172 - .0 3 9 - .0 2 1
t .101 1.109 -1 .5 7 4 .599 - .7 9 3 - .5 2 3
p r o b .46 .136 .060 .275 .216 .201
tO
C o e f f i c i e n t - .0 4 5 .283 - .1 0 2 - .0 5 2 - .0 2 3 - .0 2 9
t - .1 0 4 .478 -1 .4 4 7 - .9 0 1 - .4 4 6 .713
p r o b .559 .317 .077 .186 .379 .239
t+ 1
C o e f f i c i e n t - .0 5 0 .346 - .0 7 4 .025 - .0 1 8 - .0 3 7
t - .1 5 0 .542 - .9 6 5 .083 - .3 4 2 - .8 8 6
p r o b .440 .295 .269 .467 .367 .189
t+ 2
C o e f f i c i e n t .530 .823 .016 .194 - .0 4 8 - .0 1 6
t 1.103 1.101 .155 1.406 - .9 6 1 - .3 6 1
p r o b .137 .138 .439 .083 .170 .359
